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ABSTRACT
Congress passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in 1977 as a
component of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. The purpose of the
FCPA was to hold U.S. corporations and individuals criminally
responsible for bribing foreign officials. The Act contains a series of
requirements, prohibitions, terms and concepts with which
companies are required to comply. Within one of these prohibitions,
the business nexus provision states that U.S. companies and their
personnel are prohibited from corruptly paying or offering to pay
anything of value to a foreign official “in order to obtain or retain
business.”
The Fifth Circuit decision in United States v. Kay addressed the
business nexus provision in a case of first impression. The issue in
Kay concerned whether payments to Haitian foreign officials in an
effort to reduce customs and sales taxes owed to the Haitian
government fell within the FCPA’s scope. The issue presented was
in contrast to a more common FCPA scenario in which a company
allegedly makes improper payments to a “foreign official” to secure
a foreign government contract. The Kay court held that bribing such
officials to get lower tax payments could in fact be considered
obtaining or retaining business. Thus, the court concluded that
obtaining or retaining business by way of a bribe improves the
business opportunities of the payor, irrespective of whether that
assistance is direct or indirect, whether it is related to administering
the law, awarding, extending, or renewing a contract, or whether the
purpose is the execution or preservation an agreement. This
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expansion of the business nexus element resulted in an increased
number of enforcement actions brought under the Act.
This Note argues that the Fifth Circuit court in Kay incorrectly
interpreted the business nexus provision of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act by holding that any bribe that results in an increased
profit margin will then satisfy the business nexus element, so long as
it can be shown that the increased profits helped the company obtain
or retain business in some specific manner. It contends that because
every bribe that a company makes is assumedly going to increase
profits for a company by reducing costs in some manner or another,
increased profits lead to increased business, unavoidably helping the
company obtain or retain business. Therefore, the holding in Kay
mandated that increased profit margins satisfy the business nexus
requirement so long as it can be shown that the increased profits
helped the company obtain or retain business; this Note, however,
ultimately concludes that the precedent set by the Fifth Circuit in
Kay should no longer be followed as the circuit’s interpretation
allows for the provision to become a self-fulfilling requirement. The
correct interpretation for the business nexus requirement should be
restricted to obtaining or retaining contracts with any entity deemed
to be a foreign official. The requirement should be read to restrict
bribes made to assist the issuer or domestic concern in obtaining or
retaining contracts with any entity deemed to be a foreign official.
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INTRODUCTION
While today’s public distrust of politicians and business institutions
seems to be at an all-time high, the aftermath of the Watergate scandal
left the public in a comparable state of suspicion of those who were
expected to be leading the country at the time.1 Watergate revealed that
many large multinational corporations maintained “slush funds”—or
funds for financing political or commercial corruption—for illicit
payments made both domestically and abroad. 2 Following the
Watergate crisis and subsequent political turmoil, the Securities
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) conducted an investigation to discover
the extent to which corporations were making illegal contributions to
political campaigns. 3 The SEC uncovered widespread abuse of these
“slush funds.” 4 In an effort to illuminate and eliminate corporate
corruption, the SEC indicated it would refrain from bringing
enforcement actions against corporations who voluntarily disclosed
making similar illicit payments; over 400 companies, including over
twenty percent of Fortune 500 companies, admitted to making improper
or illegal payments overseas to foreign officials in order to receive
favorable treatment.5 The aggregate amount of money admitted to being
used for bribery was estimated at over $300 million. 6 It was in this
environment, combined with the ensuing public outcry, that Congress

1. See Watergate and the Legacy of Distrust, CHI. TRIB., June 17, 1992, available
at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1992-06-17/news/9202230536_1_
watergate-hotel-senate-select-committee-hearings-distrust.
2. See H. Lowell Brown, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under the 1988
Amendments to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Does the Government’s Reach Now
Exceed Its Grasp?, 26 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 239, 241 (2001).
3. See Andrew Brady Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions: Understanding Anti-Bribery
Legislation as Economic Sanctions Against Emerging Markets, 62 FLA. L. REV. 351,
359 (2010).
4. See Brown, supra note 2.
5. H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4 (1977), available at http://www.justice.gov/
criminal/fraud/fcpa/history/1977/houseprt-95-640.pdf.
6. Id.
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signed the FCPA into law on December 19, 1977, as an amendment to
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.7
The aftermath of Watergate led to an unprecedented number of
disclosures of bribes in the domestic and international spheres, kickback
commissions, political payoffs, and other controversial financial
transactions involving both U.S. and foreign corporations.8 These seedy
transactions were concealed using elaborate methods of deception,
including the falsification of records and the structuring of fictitious
transactions, a practice generally referred to as management fraud.9
Stories of improper payments first began to emerge in the
investigations after the Watergate scandal, when the Special
Prosecutor’s Office discovered that a considerable number of American
corporations had made illegal political campaign contributions during
the 1972 presidential election. 10
To determine whether this
nondisclosure violated federal securities laws, the SEC launched
investigations into the matter.11 The Watergate scandal, however, only
attracted public scrutiny surrounding domestic issues; international
matters were only unveiled after the revelation of an unrelated event
known as “Bananagate.” 12 Bananagate was first brought to attention
when Eli Black, the President and Chief Executive Officer of the fruit
company United Brands, now Chiquita, jumped to his death from the
forty-fourth floor of the Pan Am Building in Manhattan.13 Black’s death
was followed by an SEC investigation that uncovered a $1.25 million
bribe that had been authorized by Black payable to the President of
Honduras in order to avoid the imposition of a confiscatory export duty

7. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (amending section 13(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78q(b)).
8. See id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4.
9. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4.
10. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical
View of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099,
1115–16 (1977).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See David Pauly & Rich Thomas, The Great Banana Bribe, NEWSWEEK, Apr.
21 1975, at 76; see also Chiquita Brands, International, Inc. History,
FUNDINGUNIVERSE,
http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/chiquitabrands-international-inc-history/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2012).
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on bananas.14 Thus, Bananagate shifted the focus from illegal domestic
political contributions to international commercial corruption. 15
Following the Bananagate scandal, various other misdeeds were
uncovered such as Lockheed Corporation’s worldwide bribery of senior
ministers and questionable payments made by Gulf in South Korea,
Exxon in Italy, and the Northrop and Grumman corporations in the
Middle East.16
Although Congress signed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(“FCPA” or “the Act”) into law in 1977 (as a result of the slew of
federal investigations following Watergate), the SEC and Department of
Justice have only recently began seriously utilizing the Act as an
enforcement mechanism. 17 Because of the drastic increase, many
questions have arisen surrounding the Act’s requirements and
prohibitions.18
This Note examines a specific area of confusion in the FCPA: the
“business nexus” requirement. Part I explains the background of the
FCPA, including its legislative history, enactment, and amendments.
Specifically, this Part outlines the provisions of the legislation, the
exceptions, the affirmative defenses that have been included in the Act,
and the policy rationale and intent of Congress in enacting the FCPA.
Part II describes the legal problem surrounding the “obtain or retain
business” requirement, also known as the “business nexus” requirement.
In particular, this Part discusses the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of the
“obtaining or retaining business” requirement as discussed in United
States v. Kay. Part III advocates that the current interpretation of the
14. Chiquita Brands, International, Inc. History, supra note 13. In a later
investigation, the SEC also accused United Brands of bribing European officials with
$750,000. Id.
15. See Coffee, supra note 10.
16. See id.
17. To provide a clearer view of the expansion in litigation that has been brought
under the Act, it may be useful to examine some figures that highlight the current era of
invigorated enforcement: In the 1980s and 1990s, the government consistently brought
a couple of FCPA actions per year. Between 2007 and 2009, the Department of Justice
brought sixty-four FCPA enforcement actions, and the S.E.C., forty-seven – nearly
double the total number of FCPA cases brought in the first twenty-eight years that the
statute was in effect. See Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal
Legislation: The Unruly Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 GA. L.
REV. 489, 522 (2011).
18. See id. at 560–61.
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“obtain or retain business” requirement should be discarded in favor of a
narrower alternative that would limit the application of the FCPA to
obtaining or retaining contracts with any entity deemed to be a foreign
official, thereby reestablishing and clarifying the “obtaining or retaining
business” requirement as a necessary provision under the FCPA. Using
this interpretation would allow corporations to have comfort knowing
that not every payment made to a foreign official would be classified as
a bribe. This would also allow for the establishment of more effective
corporate compliance programs.
I. THE ENACTMENT, SCOPE, AND FEATURES OF THE FOREIGN
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
This Part provides a detailed background of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act. Section A provides some background pertaining to the
scope of the Act, namely, who qualifies as a “foreign official” as defined
by Congress. Section B outlines the exception to the “foreign official”
rule and the affirmative defenses against bribery of foreign officials as
outlined by and included in the Act.
A. THE BEGINNINGS AND PURPOSE OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES
ACT
The FCPA prohibits corporations from bribing foreign officials in
an attempt to persuade the official to assist the corporation in obtaining
or retaining business in foreign markets.19 Under the Act, it is unlawful
to offer or give anything of value to a foreign official to influence an
official act, induce the foreign official to do, or omit to do, any act in
violation of lawful duty, secure an improper advantage, influence the
government to affect or influence any act or decision of the government;
or to obtain, retain or direct business to any person.20
The Act developed directly from the federal probe into the
Watergate scandal, a time period in which the political and economic
climates were quite similar to those of today. 21 The United States
19.
20.
21.

15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(a), 78dd-3(a) (2006).
Id.
See Sam Singer, Comment, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the Private
Equity Era: Extracting a Hidden Element, 23 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 273, 274–75
(2009).
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enjoyed a period of large-scale global business expansion, while
concurrently engaged in international wars.22 Eventually, this led to the
exposing of national corporate scandals, causing the market to contract
and recoil.23 The resulting overwhelming sentiment was one of distrust,
with many believing that institutional structures, particularly those of
big business, were corrupt and ill-founded.24 The international bribery
schemes of the 1970s brought to light fundamental issues in global
corporate procedures, including inadequate supervisory procedures,
insufficient risk calculations, and lack of proper internal communication
systems.25
At this time, the United States had laws prohibiting corporate
bribery.26 With the passage of the FCPA, however, the United States
became the first country to bar its citizens from bribing international
officials.27 It was not until more than two decades later that a significant
number of other countries, led by the members of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), began to enact
similar legislation.28
The primary purpose of the FCPA was to prohibit bribery that
allows officials to misuse their discretionary authority, impede the
functioning of efficient markets, or have an adverse impact on U.S.
foreign relations.29 Despite these objectives, however, Congress made
an exception and allowed for smaller payments to be made to expedite
governmental actions, recognizing that such payments are at times
necessary and within the realm of effective business. 30 The Act
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

See id. at 274.
See Westbrook, supra note 17, at 500.
See id.
Id.
See, e.g., Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA), ch. 2907, §§ 71–79, 34 Stat.
1260 (1906) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 622 (2006)); United States Grain
Standards Act (USGSA), ch. 313 , § 9, 39 Stat. 482 (1916) (codified as amended at 7
U.S.C. § 85 (2006)), I.R.C. § 162(c) (2006); Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act),
ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006));
Copeland “Anti-Kickback” Act, Pub. L. No. 73-324, § 1, 48 Stat. 948 (1934) (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 874 (2006)).
27. See Westbrook, supra note 17, at 501.
28. See Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions, Dec. 18, 1997, art. 1.1, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-43,
37 I.L.M. 1, 6 (1998), available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/18/38028044.pdf.
29. See United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 747 (5th Cir. 2004).
30. Id.
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approaches the prohibitions in two ways.31 The anti-bribery provisions
outlaw payments to foreign officials made “corruptly” for the purpose of
obtaining or retaining business and impose criminal sanctions on
corporations and individuals for any violations. 32 Second, the Act
provides that businesses must keep books and records according to the
Act’s provisions to ensure that these types of unlawful payments are
discoverable. 33 This Note focuses on the anti-bribery element of the
FCPA.
Legislative history strongly suggests that the anti-bribery
provisions were not intended to apply to illicit payments made to
procure “routine governmental action,” (also known as “grease” or
“facilitating” payments), though these types of payments were not
specifically referred to in the 1977 Act.34 Congress has since amended
the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA twice in an effort to clarify its
original intent in enacting the statute and to expand the Act’s scope,
once in 1988 and again in 1998.35
B. THE SCOPE OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND WHO
QUALIFIES AS A “FOREIGN OFFICIAL”
The extent of who should be included in the term “foreign official”
is currently a widely debated issue. 36 The FCPA defines a foreign
official as “any officer or employer of a foreign government,” and “any
department agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a public
international organization, or any person acting in an official capacity
for or on behalf of such government or department, agency, or
instrumentality, or for or on behalf of any such public international
organization.”37 It is clear that the FCPA categorizes elected foreign
government officials, foreign heads of state, and employees of foreign
31. See Stacy Williams, Grey Areas of FCPA Compliance, CURRENTS: INT’L
TRADE L.J., Winter 2008, at 14.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 8 (1977); S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 10 (1977).
35. See S. REP. NO. 100-85, at 83 (1987), see also 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(1) (2006).
36. See Eric M. Pedersen, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Its Application
to U.S. Business Operations in China, 7 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 13, 32 (2008) (discussing
recent enforcement actions).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(1)(A).
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governmental agencies as “foreign officials.” 38 It is the improper
payments made to these types of foreign officials for purposes of
obtaining or retaining business that Congress sought to prohibit by
passing the FCPA in 1977.39
Although the FCPA does not define “agency or instrumentality,”
the Department of Justice and the SEC interpret “instrumentality” to
include state-owned or controlled enterprises and businesses, thereby
making the employees of foreign state-owned or controlled companies
“foreign officials” for purposes of the FCPA. 40 Although these
companies possess the attributes of private business (such as publiclytraded shares), they are considered an “instrumentality” of the
government, and so their employees are included within the scope of the
FCPA. 41 The Department of Justice has specified that it takes an
expansive view of the words “agency or instrumentality” to include
quasi-governmental bodies. It also looks beyond share ownership in

38.
39.
40.

Id. § 78dd-1(a).
See Brown, supra note 2.
See Information at 4, United States v. DePuy, Inc., No. 11-cr-00099-JDB
(D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2011) (“Health care providers who work at publicly owned hospitals
are . . . ‘foreign officials’ as . . . defined in the FCPA.” (citation omitted)); Information
at 5, United States v. Baker Hughes Servs. Int’l, Inc., No. H-07-129 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 11,
2007) (“Kazakhoil was controlled by officials of the Government of Kazakhstan and, as
such, constituted an ‘instrumentality’ of a foreign government, and its officers and
employees were ‘foreign officials,’ within the meaning of the FCPA.” (citation
omitted)); see also United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (C.D. Cal. 2011)
(holding that the jury could consider the state’s degree of control of the company, and
the state’s own characterization of the entity as either independent or an arm of the
government); Plea Agreement at Exhibit 1, United States v. DPC (Tianjin) Co., No. CR
05-482 (C.D. Cal. May 20, 2005) (noting that DPC was charged with making payments
totaling approximately $1.6 million to physicians and laboratory personnel employed
by government-owned hospitals in China to influence their decisions to purchase the
company’s products).
41. See Opinion Procedure Release, Dep’t of Justice, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Review, No. 94-01 (May 13, 1994) [hereinafter Opinion Procedure Release No. 94-01],
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/1994/9401.pdf (opining
that a general director of a state-owned enterprise being transformed into a joint stock
company is a “foreign official” under the FCPA, despite a foreign law opinion that the
individual would not be regarded as either a government employee or a public official
in the foreign country).
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companies to examine factors such as the role performed by the entity or
the degree of the foreign government’s influence.42
C. EXCEPTIONS AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES INCLUDED IN THE FCPA
The FCPA provides an exception to the prohibition on bribery for
“facilitating or expediting” the performance of regular governmental
actions, including grease payments for mail delivery, electricity, and
visas.43 The exception for grease payments or facilitating payments was
made explicit in the 1988 amendment.44 The conference also clarified
that the exception was to apply only to payments in connection with
commonly performed actions, and not to payments for governmental
approvals which require a government official’s discretion, if the actions
obtain or retain business.45 This exception has been strictly interpreted
in enforcement actions, and while the Act does not specify a monetary
cap for facilitating payments, the allowed payments to date have been
less than $ 1,000.46
Two affirmative defenses can be raised under the FCPA. The first
was incorporated through the 1988 amendment and created an
affirmative defense for payments that are legal in the country of the
foreign official to whom they are offered.47 Thus, if a corporation can
successfully show that “the payment, gift, offer or promise of anything
of value that was made, was lawful under the written laws and
regulations of the foreign official’s, political party’s, party official’s, or
candidate’s country,” the corporation can avoid liability under the Act.48
The 1988 House-Senate conference clarified, however, that even if a
foreign country lacked a certain written law, this alone would not be
42. See DONALD ZARIN, Introduction, in PRACTICE LAW INSTITUTE, COURSE
HANDBOOK: THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 2010, § 1-1, at 88 (2010)
[hereinafter PLI COURSE HANDBOOK] (citing Opinion Procedure Release No. 94-1,
supra note 41). See also Complaint, SEC v. Siemens AG, No. 1:08-CV-02167 (D.D.C.
Dec. 12, 2008) (characterizing a consultant working for a governmental unit as a
government official).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b).
44. H.R. REP. NO. 100-576, at 921 (1988) (Conf. Rep.).
45. Id.
46. See David E. Dworsky, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
671, 684 (2009).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c).
48. Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(c)(1).
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sufficient to satisfy the defense. 49 Rather, when interpreting what is
lawfully written into the laws and regulations of a country, normal rules
of legal construction would apply.50
To successfully argue this defense, the law must be affirmatively
provided for by statute; “neither negative implication, custom, nor tacit
approval will qualify.” 51 Since no country has written laws that
explicitly permit bribery, this defense has traditionally only been applied
in cases where government officials are lawfully engaged in commercial
activities and for political contributions.52 In a recent example of an
attempted application of this affirmative defense, the defendant in
United States v. Kozeny argued on the basis of the “local law” during his
trial for violating the FCPA by endeavoring to bribe Azeri officials
regarding a state-owned oil company in Azerbaijan. 53 Defendant
Bourke claimed the payments he made were lawful under Azeri law, and
that since he reported them, they could not be considered criminal. 54
Therefore, Bourke argued that the local law made his bribe lawful;
however, the court rejected his arguments, holding that though Azeri
law excused the payor from criminal liability upon reporting the bribe,
that was not the functional equivalent of the bribe being legal.55
The second affirmative defense under the FCPA concerns
“reasonable and bona fide expenditures”:
It allows a payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of value if: 1)
the expense is a customary and reasonable expenditure, such as
travel and lodging expenses, incurred by or on behalf of a foreign
official and 2) the payment must be directly related to the promotion,
demonstration, or explanation of products or services; or the
execution or performance of a contract with a foreign government or
56
agency thereof.

49.
50.
51.

H.R. REP. NO. 100-576, at 921-22.
Id.
DAVID KRAKOFF ET AL., MAYER BROWN WHITE PAPER— FCPA: HANDLING
INCREASED GLOBAL ANTI-CORRUPTION ENFORCEMENT (2009), available at
http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/article.asp?id=6386.
52. ROBERT W. TARUN, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT HANDBOOK 235
(2010).
53. See United States v. Kozeny, 582 F. Supp. 2d 535, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
54. Id. at 536.
55. Id. at 540.
56. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c)(2) (2006).
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In United States v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 57 a civil enforcement
action, the Department of Justice took the position that payment for
first-class airfare and other expenses (including food and lodging) for an
Egyptian government official and his family to visit the United States
would be prohibited under the FCPA because the purpose of the visit
was to induce the Egyptian official to use his influence to award the
United States Agency for International Development (“U.S.A.I.D.”)
contracts to Metcalf & Eddy.58 Metcalf & Eddy subsequently consented
to the entry of a final judgment of permanent injunction without
admitting or denying the allegations.59
Congress also articulated in one of its subclauses that there may be
a ‘knowledge’ element to an FCPA violation. 60 A decade later,
Congress again updated the FCPA when it implemented the
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development’s Convention
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business
Transactions.61 In doing so, Congress extended the jurisdiction of the
FCPA to cover the actions of foreign nationals acting within the territory
of the United States and conduct taking place outside the territorial
boundaries of the United States, to prohibit payments for the purpose of
obtaining any improper advantage and to further prohibit payments
made to officials of international organizations or corporations, rather
than simply government officials.62
The anti-bribery provision of the FCPA prohibits U.S. corporations
and individuals acting on behalf of those corporations and issuers from
using:
Any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in
furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of
the payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or

57.
58.

United States v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., No. 99 Civ. 12566 NG (D. Mass. 1999).
Consent and Undertaking of Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., United States v. Metcalf &
Eddy, Inc., No. 99 Civ. 12566 NG (D. Mass. 1999).
59. See id.
60. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(3).
61. See generally Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions, supra note 28, art. 1.1, 37 I.L.M. at 6.
62. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-3(a).
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authorization of giving anything of value to (1) any foreign official .
63
. . [to obtain, retain, or direct business to any person.]

II. THE BUSINESS NEXUS REQUIREMENT AND ITS INTERPRETATION IN
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT DECISION UNITED STATES V. KAY
Part II of this Note discusses the legal question surrounding the
“obtain or retain business” requirement, otherwise known as the
“business nexus” requirement. In particular, this Part focuses on the
Fifth Circuit’s 2007 interpretation of the “obtaining or retaining
business” provision as discussed in United States v. Kay.
The FCPA deems it unlawful for any U.S. citizen, national,
resident, or corporation to bribe a foreign official for the purposes of
“obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any
person.” 64 The “obtaining or retaining business” clause, however, is
currently at the heart of the debate in FCPA enforcement. The provision
has been interpreted as the business nexus test, for which federal
prosecutors must show that payments were made for the purpose of
“obtaining or retaining business.”65 Historically, this element required
that payments be made in connection with a bid for a new contract or the
renewal of an existing one. Recently, the phrase “obtaining or retaining
business” has become a source of disagreement between parties, as the
interpretation varies depending on the scope each party would like to
apply to the term.66
Defendants would argue that the payments must be instrumental to,
or made for the purpose of, obtaining approval of a new government
contract or renewal of one that is already in place. 67 Under this
interpretation of the business nexus requirement, payments made merely
to increase the profitability of the corporation under an existing contract
would not be included within the provision.68 The government, on the
other hand, has taken a more expansive view, insisting that in addition to
payments to officials for the purpose of acquiring or renewing contracts,
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. § 78dd-1(a).
Id. § 78dd-2(a).
See id. § 78dd-2(a)(1)(B); see also H.R. REP. NO. 100-576, at 921.
See generally Bruce E. Yannett, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: An
Overview, in PLI COURSE HANDBOOK, supra note 42, at 720, 733 (discussing the
difficulties that came with such a broad definition).
67. See United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 743 (5th Cir. 2004)
68. See generally id.
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the provision encompasses any payments that “advance the goal of
obtaining or retaining foreign business with or for some person.” 69
Under this standard, the government claims the “obtaining or retaining
business” requirement goes far beyond the awarding or renewal of a
contract to including any foreign payments made to ensure a company’s
profitability, as generating profits are inherently the goal and fiduciary
duty of companies in obtaining or retaining business. 70 Indeed, the
Department of Justice has argued that business is a fluid, continuous
activity which includes not merely bids and written contracts, but
everyday wholesale and retail movement, the buying and selling of
commodities or services between willing buyers and sellers. 71
Therefore, it concludes that when lower duties are able to be paid by
companies, for example, they are able to turn around and sell their
product for a lower price, which provides them with the ability to
increase their business through higher profit margins and reinvestment.72
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals illustrates this point of
contention in the case United States v. Kay.73 Kay involved the bribing
of Haitian import officials to under report the duties and taxes on rice
shipped into Haiti. 74 Defendants David Kay and Douglas Murphy,
respectively President and Vice President of American Rice Inc.
(“ARI”), had allegedly bribed Haitian customs officials to accept forged
bills of lading (receipts used to transport goods by sea) and other
documentation that allowed ARI to understate the quantity of rice
imported into Haiti by about 33%, thereby significantly reducing ARI’s
customs duties and sales taxes.75 At trial, the District Court held that
payments made to foreign government officials for the purpose of
reducing customs duties and taxes did not fall under the scope of the
“obtaining or retaining business” provision of the FCPA, based on the
determination that Congress had previously considered and rejected
69.
70.

Id.
See JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, 1 TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS §1:7, §1:1 (3d ed. 2011); see also Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W.
668, 678 (Mich. 1919).
71. Appellant’s Reply Brief, United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2004)
(No. 02-20588), 2002 WL 32507956, at *4.
72. Id.
73. See United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 441–42 (5th Cir. 2007).
74. See Kay, 359 F.3d at 740.
75. Id. at 741.
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statutory language that would incorporate that particular type of
conduct.76
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit court reversed the decision of the
District Court and held that the business nexus element includes
payments other than those specifically used to acquire or retain
government contracts.77 The court found that the FCPA can at times
apply to payments to a foreign official to reduce customs and tax
liabilities if such an action assists the payer, directly or indirectly, in
obtaining or retaining business.78 The court reached its conclusion, in
part, by hypothesizing such scenarios in which the following may occur:
for example, it is possible that evading duties and sales taxes might
allow a company to underbid competitors, might help prevent a
company from going out of business, or might enable a company to
compete and obtain new contracts.79 Thus, the court concluded that the
use of a bribe to obtain or retain business improves the business of the
beneficiary, regardless of whether the assistance gained from the bribe is
direct or indirect, and whether it is related to creating or extending a
contract, or effectively enforcing the law. 80 This expansion of the
business nexus element has resulted in an “explosion” of FCPA
enforcement actions utilizing a broadened reading of the provision to
include any payments simply made to obtain an improper business
advantage. 81 Further, in a subsequent decision in the Kay matter (in
which the defendants appealed again on several grounds, including lack
of fair warning) the Fifth Circuit seemed to view the “obtain or retain
business” element even more broadly, stating that it was satisfied at the
trial level by the showing of evidence proving that the reduced taxes and
duties resulting from the bribes allowed the company to “compete . . . in
other words, in order to retain business.”82
Though believing that the bribes made to officials to understate
defendants’ duties and taxes on rice could fall within the business nexus
requirement, the court cautioned against the notion that anytime profits
are increased the beneficiary of the advantage was assisted in obtaining
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

See United States v. Kay, 200 F. Supp. 2d 681, 686 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
See Kay, 359 F.3d at 744.
See id.
See id. at 761.
Id. at 750.
See Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the Ultimate Year of
its Decade of Resurgence, 43 IND. L. REV. 389, 393–94 (2010).
82. See United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 441–42 (5th Cir. 2007).
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or retaining business.83 The Fifth Circuit clarified this claim by stating
that if such an idea were true, the FCPA’s language would be
superfluous; furthermore, it would be required at trial to show that the
increased profits helped the company obtain or retain business in some
specific fashion.84 This includes evidence that the defendant payor was
aware or on notice of what business advantages were being requested
and how the foreign official’s illegal actions were of assistance to the
defendant in obtaining these advantages.85
III. KAY’S INTERPRETATION OF “OBTAINING OR RETAINING BUSINESS”
IS SELF-FULFILLING AND DEEMS THE REQUIREMENT SUPERFLUOUS
Part III of this Note argues that the current interpretation of the
“obtain or retain business” requirement should be discarded in favor of
an interpretation that limits the definition of obtaining or retaining
business to obtaining or retaining business contracts. Such an
interpretation would reestablish the “obtaining or retaining business”
requirement as a necessary provision under the FCPA and would allow
corporations to establish compliance programs without fearing that
every payment made to a foreign official would be classified as a bribe
punishable under the Act. Additionally, the interpretation of the
“obtaining or retaining business” requirement as held by the Fifth
Circuit court in United States v. Kay should no longer be followed as it
is self-fulfilling and renders the FCPA provision unnecessary.
A. THE INTERPRETATION OF THE REQUIREMENT IN KAY SHOULD NO
LONGER BE FOLLOWED
Based on the Fifth Circuit court’s holding in Kay, the definition of
the business nexus requirement goes well beyond the immediate award
or renewal of contracts.86 Under this interpretation, future cases could
allow the government to infer that any bribe of foreign officials will
satisfy the business nexus requirement—therefore rendering the
83.
84.
85.
86.

See id.
See Kay, 359 F.3d at 760–61.
See id.
See Kay, 513 F.3d at 443 (“The explicit terms of the FCPA do not include
either language relating specifically to contracts or defining more general business
practices that may fall under the business nexus test . . . .”).
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provision unnecessary for the government to take into consideration for
evidentiary purposes.
It ought to be noted that the court did foresee the possibility that its
decision could be interpreted in such a way that rendered the business
nexus element unnecessary; however, it did not go far enough in
remedying the issue. 87 The Fifth Circuit indicated that though it
recognized that lowering tax and customs payments automatically
increases a company’s profit margin (by reducing the company’s cost of
doing business), it does not follow that such a result necessarily satisfies
the statutory business nexus element.88 The court acknowledged that if
the government was correct in postulating that anytime operating costs
are reduced (i.e., net income increases), the beneficiary would be
“receiving or keeping business.” In turn, the FCPA’s language of
assisting in obtaining or retaining business as a necessary component of
an illegal bribe would be redundant and irrelevant.89 Thus, the court
attempted to remedy this conflict by holding that if the business nexus
element is fundamental, then in addition to alleging and proving the
minimally sufficient facts to show a violation of the FCPA, the
government would also be required to show how the increased profits
helped the company obtain or retain business in some specific fashion
(for example, what business opportunities were sought to be obtained, or
how the results were meant to assist in getting or keeping business).90
Even with the Fifth Circuit’s requirement that it be proven that
increased profits help a company obtain or retain business, the court’s
interpretation of the business nexus element is still self-fulfilling and
cyclical in nature. The opinion posits that any bribe that results in an
increased profit margin could satisfy the business nexus element,91 so
long as it can be shown that the increased profits helped the company
obtain or retain business in some specific manner; however, according
to free market theory, profits are a company’s primary business goal,
and in fact, the generation of profits is a fiduciary duty of the company
87. See Kay, 359 F.3d at 760 (“Indeed, if the government is correct that anytime
operating costs are reduced the beneficiary of such advantage is assisted in getting or
keeping business, the FCPA’s language that expresses the necessary element of
assisting is obtaining or retaining business would be unnecessary, and thus
surplusage—a conclusion that we are forbidden to reach.”).
88. Id. at 759.
89. Id. at 760.
90. Id.
91. See Kay, 513 F.3d at 443.
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to its shareholders.92 Increased profits, therefore, unavoidably help fuel
the company in obtaining or retaining business (for example, through
increased shareholder demand, the ability to reinvest in capital and
technology, or by making the company more appealing for other firms
to conduct business with). 93 Every bribe that a company makes will
presumably increase profits by reducing costs in some manner or
another (for example, even if a company is able to traverse the
bureaucratic red-tape faster, the time saved will result in cost savings,
subsequently leading to an increased profit margin). Therefore, the
holding in Kay allows for increased profit margins to satisfy the
business nexus requirement so long as it can be shown that the increased
profits helped the company obtain or retain business, which will be
inherently true. The Fifth Circuit writes in Kay that “there are bound to
be circumstances” in which a customs or tax reduction merely increases
the profitability of an existing profitable company, but does not assist
the payer in obtaining or retaining business.94 This reasoning is unable
to withstand the basic tenets of corporate theory, as a reduction in cost
(leading to an increase in profits) is the very lifeblood of any profitseeking company’s business purpose.95 A reduction in business costs,
then, is included in the definition of helping a company to obtain or
retain business. I would speculate, therefore, that the Kay interpretation
has the ability to hold that every bribe satisfies business nexus
requirement.
The Fifth Circuit first noted that the ambiguity in the statutory
language is too vague to give a clear indication of the exact scope of the
business nexus element. 96 Based on an analysis of the FCPA’s
legislative history that included comparing the language adopted by
Congress and the language presented to the Senate in an SEC Report,
the court held that the ultimate language of the statute’s “obtain or retain
business” element addresses more than just obtaining or retaining
government contracts. 97 The court went on to write that because
92. See, e.g., Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase
its
Profits,
N.Y.
TIMES
MAG.,
Sept.
13,
1970,
available
at
http://www.umich.edu/~thecore/doc/Friedman.pdf.
93. Id.
94. See Kay, 359 F.3d at 760.
95. See Friedman, supra note 92.
96. See Kay, 359 F.3d at 743.
97. See id. at 748.
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Congress changed the language of the SEC Report from “obtain or
retain government contacts,” to “obtain or retain business” (thereby
using the word “business” rather than “government”), Congress
intended for the statute to apply to bribes beyond the narrow category of
payments sufficient only to “obtain or retain government contracts.”98
Thus, the government could now argue that according to the holding in
Kay, Congress intended the statute to apply to payments made to
increase the profitability of an enterprise.99
The government’s interpretation of Congress’ intent, while feasible,
is too quick to conclude that Congress intended the Act to apply to all
payments made to increase a corporation’s profitability. Rather, what
Congress may have intended by changing the wording of the statutory
language from the SEC Report’s was to merely expand the scope of
contracts to be included. Instead of only including “government
contracts,” Congress may have meant to include other contracts that
could be made with foreign officials. This interpretation is supported by
the definition of the term “foreign officials” in the FCPA.100 The FCPA
defines “foreign official” as:
Any officer or employee of a foreign government or any department,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a public international
organization, or any person acting in an official capacity or on behalf
of any such government or department, agency, or instrumentality,
101
or for or on behalf of any such public international organization.

Although “agency or instrumentality” is not defined in the FCPA,
the Department of Justice and SEC interpret “instrumentality” to include
state-owned or controlled enterprises,102 thereby making such enterprises
“foreign officials” for FCPA purposes. Additionally, the Department of
Justice recently released an opinion letter stating that the legal opinion
issued by a general director of an enterprise stating that someone is not a
government employee nor a public official of that entity is not
dispositive since the enterprise’s and foreign government’s

98.
99.

See id.
See Appellant’s Brief at 6, United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2004)
(No. 02-20588), 2002 WL 32507953, at *6.
100. See Pedersen, supra note 36, at 34.
101. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(f)(1)(A), 78dd-2(h)(2)(A), 78dd-3(f)(2)(A) (2006).
102. See sources cited supra note 40.
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interpretations of “foreign official” may not be the same.103 The term
“foreign officials,” as currently interpreted, extends beyond government
employees to officers or employees of state-owned businesses.104 The
FCPA provides that an officer or employee of any “department, agency,
or instrumentality” of the state may qualify as a foreign official,
including, for example, state-owned hospitals or corporations.105 Thus,
it is possible that in changing the wording of the “obtain or retain
business” element, Congress attempted to prevent confusion about
whether the Act only applied to government contracts rather than all
potential contracts with any foreign official.
The offered interpretation restricting the business nexus
requirement to obtaining or retaining contracts with any entity deemed
to be a foreign official seems both more plausible and logical. Read this
way, the element remains useful within the provisions of the FCPA.
This interpretation also seems more likely since the statutory language
uses the phrase “obtaining or retaining,” and business is ultimately
obtained or retained through contracts.106
CONCLUSION
As FCPA enforcement has been on the rise in recent years with no
sign of significant decline in the near future, Congress should provide
guidance regarding its legislative intent on the meaning of the
“obtaining or retaining” clause. 107 Unfortunately, Congress has not
provided much of an explanation of what the FCPA requires on many of
its hotly debated issues and the Judiciary and Executive Branch have not
offered much guidance.108 The greatest attempts at clarification come
from the FCPA Opinion Procedure Releases issued by the Department
of Justice, as well as litigated cases; the latter of which are rare with

103. A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE 20–21 (2012), http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/docs/dojdocb.html.
104. See id.
105. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(f)(1)(A), 78dd-2(h)(2)(A), 78dd-3(f)(2)(A) (2006).
106. ROBERT A. HILLMAN, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 2 (2d ed. 2009)
(“Contract law also applies to mammoth deals between huge companies in the business
world . . . .”).
107. See Westbrook, supra note 17, at 499.
108. See Williams, supra note 31, at 16.
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regards to the business nexus element.109 The FCPA Opinion Procedure
Releases clearly take the government’s stance on the issue, arguing for a
broad interpretation of the business nexus requirement to continue
increasing enforcement actions.110
As previously noted, Congress last amended the FCPA in 1998.111
Perhaps now, in an era of palpably increased enforcement actions (with
companies willing to settle because they are unclear on, and weary of,
the law112), it is high time for legislature to respond to the atmosphere of
uncertainty.113 The current interpretation of the provision, as understood
by Kay, would allow for the government to expand the requirement in a
manner that is unsound and in contradiction with the tenets of the area
of law which it is attempting to regulate—an unfortunate irony that
Congress (or the judiciary, through new precedent) can and should
remedy.
To help render the provision once again workable for those
attempting to abide by the FCPA, the precedent set by the Fifth Circuit
in Kay should no longer be followed. The requirement should be read to
restrict bribes made to assist the issuer or domestic concern in obtaining
or retaining contracts with any entity deemed to be a foreign official.
“Foreign official,” as defined by the government, extends beyond
government employees to officers or employees of state-owned
businesses and state-owned enterprises.114 Since enforcement agencies
deem these individuals to be “foreign officials” regardless of rank, title,
or classification under local foreign law, this definition may have been
the congressional intent employed in changing the statutory wording
from “obtain or retain government contracts” to “obtain or retain
business,” rather than the analysis of the phrasing change drawn in
Kay. 115 My proposed interpretation for the business nexus provision
would allow the business nexus requirement to be workable, rather than
a self-fulfilling requirement that has rendered itself obsolete. 116
109.
110.

See Opinion Procedure Release No. 94-1, supra note 41.
See A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, supra note

102.
111.
112.
113.
114.

See H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 8 (1977); S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 10 (1977).
See Koehler, supra note 81, at 406.
See Williams, supra note 31.
See A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, supra note

102.
115.
116.

See United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 748 (5th Cir. 2004).
See Williams, supra note 31, at 18.
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Regardless, with the United States and other countries, most notably the
United Kingdom, intent on creating and enforcing anti-corruption
laws,117 it is crucial that a clearly-defined interpretation of the business
nexus provision be delineated and adopted so that United States
companies can avoid committing unlawful acts during the course of
business with international entities.

117. See, e.g., Press Release, Serious Fraud Office (SFO), Mabey & Johnson Ltd.
Prosecuted by the SFO (July 10, 2009), available at http://www.sfo.gov.uk/pressroom/press-release-archive/press-releases-2009/mabey--johnson-ltd-prosecuted-by-thesfo.aspx.

